The Netherlands Court of Audit built a Crime Harm Index (CHI) to test whether police investigation priorities actually target the crimes causing the greatest societal harm. They only partly do: over 10,000 reports of CHI-serious crime went unprocessed in 2024, including 1,600 that had themselves been prioritised by the Public Prosecution Service or the minister. Underneath this sits a Documentation failure - registration systems cannot trace whether investigation results align with stated priorities - and a Reporting gap so complete that neither the minister nor the police commissioner can say what is spent on each of the police's statutory tasks. 791,000 new crime cases recorded by the police in 2024; 755,300 finished processing. EUR 8.1 billion total police expenditure in 2024, representing 32% of the Ministry of Justice and Security's budget. Over 10,000 CHI-serious crime reports were not processed in 2024, including 1,600 that had been prioritised by the Public Prosecution Service or the minister. 12,300 FTE deployed on major national or international criminal investigations in 2024 - with results unknown for all of them. Police Act 2012 - establishes the statutory division of police tasks and responsibilities in the Netherlands. Public Prosecution Service Investigation Guidelines, 2013 (Aanwijzing voor de opsporing) - setting national investigation priorities. Minister of Justice and Security's Security Agenda 2023-2026 - the government's own priority-setting instrument. Ministry of Justice and Security's budget line for police expenditure (Budget article 31). Alignment of investigation priorities with the Crime Harm Index (CHI). Regional consistency in processing serious crime reports. Traceability of investigation results and costs to statutory tasks and stated priorities. Audit approach: analysis of police and Public Prosecution Service data and registration systems, and review of ministerial and commissioner policy documents. The minister has prioritised cybercrime and other online crime, whereas these crimes have only low or moderate CHI scores (Exec. summary pp.4-5; Sec.3.5 pp.16-19, Fig. 6). A Goal-setting gap: objectives were set (Security Agenda 2023-2026; PPS Investigation Guidelines 2013) without calibration against harm/severity evidence, operating independently of the Regulatory system the Court's own index provides. In 2024, over 10,000 reported crimes regarded by the CHI as serious were not processed by the police; of these, 1,600 had been prioritised (Exec. summary pp.5-6, Fig. 1; Sec.4.2-4.3 pp.22-26, Fig. 8) by the Public Prosecution Service or the minister. A screening Procedure that exists but is not reliably executed, with no party holding Responsibility for tracking whether prioritised cases are carried through, and no Monitoring mechanism surfacing the gap before audit. "BOSZ uses different definitions from those used by the Public Prosecution Service... the registration system makes it impossible to monitor the extent to which police investigation results align with priorities" (Sec.5.1 pp.29-30). A Documentation failure - records do not encode the categories needed to check policy against practice - compounded by inadequate Tools and a consequent Reporting gap. The police have no information available on the outcomes of the 11,500 major national or international criminal investigations (Exec. summary p.6, Fig. 2; Sec.5.1 p.30, Fig. 12) carried out by over 12,300 FTE. No systematic Monitoring of throughput or outcomes for this capacity, and no Results review comparing investigation outcomes against objectives once cases close. The Justice and Security Inspectorate (2025) concluded that frontline teams were not properly equipped to handle these more serious, complex forms of crime (Exec. summary p.7; Sec.5.2 pp.31-32, Fig. 13-14). A Responsibility drift - task allocation shifted from the designed division of labour under capacity pressure - meeting a Human capital and Training shortfall, without a Design re-engineering of the process to match. The police's administration system does not break down costs by statutory task; neither the minister nor the commissioner can state or establish how much public money is spent on each of these statutory tasks separately (Exec. summary p.7; Sec.5.3 pp.32-34, Fig. 15). The EUR 8.1 billion Finance commitment is a single figure that Reporting and Documentation cannot decompose for parliamentary or management use. Rotterdam police, for example, immediately dismissed a relatively high number (19%) of serious crimes reported (Sec.3.4 p.15; Sec.4.4 pp.26-27, Table 3, Fig. 11), compared with East-Netherlands (12%) and Limburg (11%). The same national objective is operationalised inconsistently across regional Procedures, reflecting unharmonised local Design choices ('dynamic steering' versus 'operational-coordination points').