A serious Case: Police priorities in criminal investigations
SCALE
- 791,000 new crime cases were recorded by the police in 2024, of which 755,300 finished processing.
- EUR 8.1 billion of police expenditure in 2024 - about 32 percent of the Ministry of Justice and Security's budget.
- Over 10,000 reports of serious crime went unprocessed in 2024, including 1,600 that had been prioritised.
COMPLIANCE
- A national police act sets the statutory division of police tasks and responsibilities.
- Prosecution service investigation guidelines and the ministry's multi-year security agenda set national investigation priorities.
- A ministerial budget article is the basis on which police expenditure is authorised and accounted for.
ECONOMY
- EUR 8.1 billion of police expenditure in 2024, about 32 percent of the ministry's budget.
- Costs cannot be broken down by statutory task, so no task-level cost figure exists for parliament or management.
EFFICIENCY
- 791,000 cases were recorded in 2024 and 755,300 finished processing.
- Over 10,000 reports of serious crime went unprocessed, including 1,600 that had been prioritised.
- Immediate dismissal rates vary by region, from 11-12 percent in Limburg and East-Netherlands to 19 percent in Rotterdam.
EFFECTIVENESS
- Priorities only partly track the most harmful crime: online crime is prioritised despite low to moderate harm-index scores.
- The outcomes of 11,500 major investigations, absorbing 12,300 FTE, are unknown.
- Registration systems cannot show whether investigation results align with the priorities that were set.
1. Investigation priorities not calibrated to crime severity (CHI)
Goal-setting Guidance
The minister has prioritised cybercrime and other online crime, whereas these crimes have only low or moderate CHI scores (Exec. summary pp.4-5; Sec.3.5 pp.16-19, Fig. 6). A Goal-setting gap: objectives were set (Security Agenda 2023-2026; PPS Investigation Guidelines 2013) without calibration against harm/severity evidence, operating independently of the Regulatory system the Court's own index provides.
- Function: Governance
- Value: Regulatory system
- Stakeholders: Policy setter
- Quality: Clear objectives and goal-setting
2. 10,000 serious crime reports left unprocessed despite prioritisation
Procedures Responsibility Monitoring Coordination
In 2024, over 10,000 reported crimes regarded by the CHI as serious were not processed by the police; of these, 1,600 had been prioritised (Exec. summary pp.5-6, Fig. 1; Sec.4.2-4.3 pp.22-26, Fig. 8) by the Public Prosecution Service or the minister. A screening Procedure that exists but is not reliably executed, with no party holding Responsibility for tracking whether prioritised cases are carried through, and no Monitoring mechanism surfacing the gap before audit.
- Function: Governance
- Stakeholders: Operator
- Quality: Functioning oversight and governance
3. BOSZ/Summ-IT registration systems cannot trace priorities to results
Documentation Tools Reporting
"BOSZ uses different definitions from those used by the Public Prosecution Service... the registration system makes it impossible to monitor the extent to which police investigation results align with priorities" (Sec.5.1 pp.29-30). A Documentation failure - records do not encode the categories needed to check policy against practice - compounded by inadequate Tools and a consequent Reporting gap.
- Function: IT
- Quality: Reliable, integrated information base Appropriate use of technology and automation
4. Results of 11,500 major investigations unknown
Monitoring Results review
The police have no information available on the outcomes of the 11,500 major national or international criminal investigations (Exec. summary p.6, Fig. 2; Sec.5.1 p.30, Fig. 12) carried out by over 12,300 FTE. No systematic Monitoring of throughput or outcomes for this capacity, and no Results review comparing investigation outcomes against objectives once cases close.
- Function: Planning
- Quality: Reliable, integrated information base Functioning oversight and governance
5. Serious crimes increasingly assigned to under-equipped frontline teams
Responsibility Training Design
The Justice and Security Inspectorate (2025) concluded that frontline teams were not properly equipped to handle these more serious, complex forms of crime (Exec. summary p.7; Sec.5.2 pp.31-32, Fig. 13-14). A Responsibility drift - task allocation shifted from the designed division of labour under capacity pressure - meeting a Human capital and Training shortfall, without a Design re-engineering of the process to match.
- Function: Human resources
- Value: Human capital
- Stakeholders: Operator
- Quality: Adequately staffed, skilled workforce
6. No insight into police spending per statutory task
Reporting Documentation
The police's administration system does not break down costs by statutory task; neither the minister nor the commissioner can state or establish how much public money is spent on each of these statutory tasks separately (Exec. summary p.7; Sec.5.3 pp.32-34, Fig. 15). The EUR 8.1 billion Finance commitment is a single figure that Reporting and Documentation cannot decompose for parliamentary or management use.
- Function: Governance
- Value: Finance
- Stakeholders: Policy setter
- Quality: Reliable, integrated information base Cost control and value for money
7. Regional inconsistency in processing serious crime reports
Procedures Design
Rotterdam police, for example, immediately dismissed a relatively high number (19%) of serious crimes reported (Sec.3.4 p.15; Sec.4.4 pp.26-27, Table 3, Fig. 11), compared with East-Netherlands (12%) and Limburg (11%). The same national objective is operationalised inconsistently across regional Procedures, reflecting unharmonised local Design choices ('dynamic steering' versus 'operational-coordination points').
- Stakeholders: Operator
- Quality: Clear objectives and goal-setting
Control focus
| ICS phase | Control function | Cases |
|---|---|---|
| Initial phase | Goal-setting | 1. Investigation priorities not calibrated to crime severity (CHI) |
| Guidance | 1. Investigation priorities not calibrated to crime severity (CHI) | |
| Responsibility | 2. 10,000 serious crime reports left unprocessed despite prioritisation<br/>5. Serious crimes increasingly assigned to under-equipped frontline teams | |
| Training | 5. Serious crimes increasingly assigned to under-equipped frontline teams | |
| Design | 5. Serious crimes increasingly assigned to under-equipped frontline teams<br/>7. Regional inconsistency in processing serious crime reports | |
| Work processes | Procedures | 2. 10,000 serious crime reports left unprocessed despite prioritisation<br/>7. Regional inconsistency in processing serious crime reports |
| Monitoring | 2. 10,000 serious crime reports left unprocessed despite prioritisation<br/>4. Results of 11,500 major investigations unknown | |
| Tools | 3. BOSZ/Summ-IT registration systems cannot trace priorities to results | |
| Functions applied to all stages | Coordination | 2. 10,000 serious crime reports left unprocessed despite prioritisation |
| Documentation | 3. BOSZ/Summ-IT registration systems cannot trace priorities to results<br/>6. No insight into police spending per statutory task | |
| Reporting | 3. BOSZ/Summ-IT registration systems cannot trace priorities to results<br/>6. No insight into police spending per statutory task | |
| Completion of process | Results review | 4. Results of 11,500 major investigations unknown |